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The critique of nihilism, defined as nothingness, caused by the complut lack of authentic
values and true ends, has almost completely disappeared from the Western intellectual
discourse. In Ms article me author tries to find the reason for this.
Examining the concept of nihilism, one discovers that there is no common property
that causes persons or society as a whole to be called nihilistic. Therefore, nihilism is
studied, not as an easting thing, but as a label. Since the concept ofnihilism was first used
in the cornea of the process of modernization in the time of the French revolution, some
major figures from the French sociological tradition who have an articulate opinion on
it—for or against—are selected for a case study: pre-revolutionary writers, Montesquieu,
Voltaire and Rousseau; and post-revolutionary writers, Maistre, Tbcqueville, Comte, and
Durkheim.
They all are found to label as "nihilistic "people who an, in one way or another, their
adversaries on the issue of modernization. They feel threatened by the labelled, in
Wittgenstein's terminology, in their form of life. Therefore, the use of the concept of
nihilism is a case of what Berger and Ludanam call "nihilation, " the conceptual elimina-
tion of a competing form of life.
Typical of the label of nihilism is an understanding of the world in metaphysical, not
in theological terms, as was the case in earlier times of great upheaval, when heresy and
witchcraft were the appropriate labels. There is a continuity between these labels, now
extensively studied, and the use of "nihilism. "
INTRODUCTION: THE DISAPPEARANCE OF A CONCEPT
In the past, modem Western society has been criticized in many ways. The most influen-
tial critique, crystallized in die word "capitalism," states that all vices of modern society can
be traced back, in one way or another, to that big constellation of wealth and misery. Another
critique, often heard in the 19th and the first half of the 20th century, was dut of "nihilism. "
The modem world was said to lack values and ends, and therefore life seemed meaningless.
There were many intellectual circles in which this critique was the more influential of the two.
I . This article is both a summary and a further elaboration of some paints 1 worked out in my book
Nihilisme en de franse sociologische traduit (ter Borg, 1982).
»!•;,»%,.
2 SOCIOLOGICAL ANALYSIS
Today this severe critique seems to have disappeared almost completely from the intellec-
tual discourse. What has happened? Has the problem it denoted eclipsed? Is there no longer
nihilism in Western society? Have we overcome nihilism, as Alfred Weber hoped?1 We do not
know. We have some idea of what happened with that other critique: capitalism has changed,
and there are several theories that try to describe its development in the post-war years, or to
explain the coming of the welfare state in those terms. The Marxist tradition may be a little
outmoded at the moment, but it is still there, either as a firm tradition, or as an element of
other sociological theories. The reverse seems true for the critique of nihilism. We do not
know whether we are nihilistic or not; or whether the problem has disappeared. The only
thing we can say about the problem of nihilism is that nobody seems to be interested in it
anymore. The intellectual tradition in which this critique had a central place has vanished. It
has just faded away, leaving hardly any traces in contemporary thought. Granted, we some-
times bear the word mentioned, but this has hardly any consequence. It is not a part of a
sophisticated theory. Nihilism as a theme in the critique of society or as the nucleus of an
internationally significant theoretical tradition has disappeared. So we might say that the story
of nihilism just petered out. People no longer care.
Why is this? The reasons may be either intellectual or social. Its disappearance may be
due to the concept itself, or to the philosophical context in which it played a role. This may
have been untenable. Or it may have disappeared because of the role it played in the life of
people and in society. To find the ans.wer we must go back to the critique as it was in its heyday.
What was nihilism supposed to mean? Who used the concept and for what reason? Perhaps
after considering such issues we will be able to come to a deeper understanding of the
disappearance of the critique of nihilism, or of nihilism itself.
THE CONCEPT OF NIHILISM AND fTS PROBLEMS
In its broadest connotation, to say that one is nihilistic is to say that one has no authentic
values, no real ends, that one's whole existence is pure nothingness. If one denies this, then it
is easy to unmask the values and ends one claims as untrue, unreal, and worthless. This
critique can be directed at persons, but it can be extended easily to groups or even to society as
a whole. People can see others as nihilistic, but also themselves.
This is the standard definition I have in mind when 1 speak of nihilism, or when I say
others use the concept, perhaps even without actually using the term. The term nihilism was
introduced in several places in Europe in the period of the French Revolution (Goudsblom,
1977:3ff). It started as a term of abuse against modern trends, especially the destruction of
Christianity and tradition in general. It was the German philosopher Jacobi who initiated a
serious discussion of nihilism (Foggier, 1974: 307ff.), calling Kantian and Fichtean idealism
nihilistic because it abstracted from traditional, Christian contents. It was Hegel who replied
that two kinds of nihilism could be discerned. What Jacobi named so, he would rather call
"false nihilism"; he himself would propagate "true nihilism" (ibid.). Here, in a highly
sophisticated metaphysical discussion, we can see the beginnings of the enormous confusion
that grew up around the concept. The Russian nihilists contributed not a little to this. Ivan
Turgeniev, well acquainted with German culture, introduced it in 1862 in Russian literature
(in Rahers and Sons). It was picked up with enthusiasm by a group of youngsters who wanted
2. The conquest of nihilism was for a long time an important issue in German sociology and philosophy
(cf. Alfred Weber, 1947: L. Langrebe. 1946; D. Arendt, 1974).
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to change Russian society radically and decided to call themselves "nihilists." But according
to the broad definition I just gave, they were not nihilists at all. On the contrary, after
demolishing tradition they wanted to form a new society according to the ideas of the French
Enlightenment (Bannour, 1974). This use of the term was very far away from the standard
definition. It was Dostocvsky who brought this back. He tried to point out in some of his
novels' that destroying the tradition of Russian Christianity was the beginning of destroying
everything; opposing tradition implied in the end nihilism as defined above. The way Dos-
loevsky wrote highly impressed Nietzsche. It inspired him in the writing of most of his famous
notes on nihilism, in what was to be published posthumously as The Will to Power.' So the
concept was back in Germany again.
Nietzsche is still the most important theorist on nihilism and, like everyone after him, I
will build on some of his insights. For Nietzsche, the origin of nihilism is the unquenchable
quest for truth that is Platonic as well as Christian. No established truth can stand the
uncompromising probing that results from thi s thirst for truth. So eventually, even the belief in
truth itself was undermined. Also, in the Platonic tradition, truth implies the good and the
beautiful. In the end, then, we have lost all standards, and everything seems to be meaningless
and senseless. Life has become pointless. Nietzsche traces this unending quest for truth back
to "resentment," and thus to the will to power. We see this in Socrates's dialectics:
Isn't the irony of Socrates an expression of revolt? Of the resentment of the populace?
Doesn't he, as one of the oppressed, enjoy the fierceness of his stabbing syllogism? Isn't
he getting his own back on the aristocrats who are feiscinated by him? (1973, Vol. 2:954).
This iinmrfipg quest leads, in its utmost consequence, to nihilinn, hut also to a complete
equality. This reinforces nihilism for it leads to
the disappearance of the higher race, whose inexhaustible fertility and power keeps faith
in man alive . . . (op. cit.. Vol. 3:553).
In my analysis I will keep in mind Nietzsche's perspective, which makes him a forerunner of
the sociology of knowledge. Two other points of Nietzsche's analysis are also important in
what follows. First, there is Nietzsche's open eye for the relativity of the problern of nihilism.
It is perhaps not so much a question of absolute values, as of familiar ones:
One interpretation was destroyed: but because it passed for the interpretation, existence
seems meaningless, all seems futile (op. cit., Vol 3:853).
Secondly, there is Nietzsche's awareness of the problematic logical status of the concept. If
nothing is worthwhile, there is no point in getting excited:
. . . acting, suffering, willing, feeling have no meaning; the pathos of the nihilist is the
pathos of the 'for nothing,' and as such it is an inconsistency (op. cit., Vol. 3:549).
3. This is a main theme in Dostoievsky's great novels. The first tune it appears in a concise way is in the
first part of the Nuits pom the Underground (1864), where he attacks Chemyshevsky, one of the
forerunners of the Russian nihilists.
4. Nietzsche was not a theorist, but a writer of aphorisms, which are not always mutually consistent.
Consequently, every description of hit "theories" is an interpretation.
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And therefore:
. . . this is the most crippling thought, especially when one realizes that one is fooled,
and is not able to do without being fooled (op. cit., Vol. 3:853).
So much for a very sketchy description of the ups and downs of the term nihilism and
some of its connotations. Due to its history and meaning, we can say that nihilism has too
many connotations to be a consistent concept. This problematic status was for Nietzsche, the
main theorist on nihilism, no reason to denounce the concept. Rather, he saw it as an
expression of the enormous confusion that was caused by the complete breakdown of the
traditional values and ends.
Philosophers may think that the problematic logical status of the concept will make it
unattractive. As a social scientist I am inclined to think the opposite.1. After Nietzsche had
made the concept prestigious, its perplexity gave all thinkers the opportunity to project into it
their own frustrations about modern society. This was an opportunity many took. "Nihilism"
received ethical, metaphysical, social, political, and theological connotations. We already
have come across "true" and "false" nihilism, but there is also "positive" and "negative,"
"active" and "passive," "manifest" and "latent" nihilism. Very different things and persons
were called nihilistic. Heidegger saw Western thought in its totality as nihilistic (1961 : Vol.
2). As opposed to this, the American philosopher Stanley Rosen claimed that everything is
nihilistic which is not rational (1969). In the thirties, Hermann Rauschning called Hitler and
nazism nihilistic (1975). But Tolstoy was called nihilistic as well.'And these are only a few out
of marry examples.
What needs to be explained is why so many eminent thinkers used the concept. Why did
they not choose a less problematic concept? Both the brilliance and the fragmentary character
of Nietzsche's analysis had made the concept not only prestigious, but also inspiring and
imaginative. Thanks to Nietzsche, "nihilism" had become a powerful concept, apt to impress
people. This helps to explain why they used it, but not why they used it for such divergent
things and persons. What have they in common that the concept of nihilism should be used for
them? Nothing, I am afraid. It seems to me that it is not a common property that makes them
victim of this täte, but a common relationship to the subject that is eager to call them so.
Therefore, in studying nihilism we may be dealing not with properties of an object, but with
the characteristics of relations between a subject and an object. This means that a sociological
theory of nihilism should not be about some actual feature in a so-called nihilistic society, but
about the habit of persons labeling people or even society itself as nihilistic. What I am
arguing is that it is not fruitful to study nihilism as a property. We should study "nihilism" as a
label.
To make this plausible I will turn to the French sociological tradition. It is not well known
that the concept of nihilism was also important in this tradition because the word, "nihilism"
is only used occasionally. But the broad meaning, as given in the standard definition above, is
often referred to. How and why this is done in 18th and 19th century France is the subject of
this article as a case study that will enable us to learn something more of the way the concept of
nihilism was used.
5. Here I jump from a logical to a sociological level of analysis. I can do so without fal I ing into the trap of
relativism, that everlasting danger of the sociology of knowledge, because 1 started with a logical analysis
of the concept of nihilism. Finding this concept problematic. I turn to social science to understand its
success. The fallacy of relativism is committed only when the social function of a concept is taken as a
reason for denying its validity.
6. By Gorki, Thomas Mann, and Isaiah Berlin, cittd in Goudsblom, 1977:18.
THEPROBL
NIHILISM IN THE FRENCH SOC
For investigating the use of th.
tradition has many advantages. To tx
of their predecessors. Secondly, it it
on society, without hiding behind o
like the Germans. This makes their
the concept of nihilism has somethii
us to a third advantage. As oppo
incorporated into traditional societ
France were more abrupt, making 11
are two parties, one in favor of mod
that the authors belonging to the di
them were ambivalent; their person
cal opinions they advocated. I see tl
in a clear-cut situation often have to
clear for their public and their alii
French classical sociology was
This debate lasted for at least two cc
violence. During the 18th century
Both Voltaire and Diderot actually
always lived near the border of the i
as an estranged paranoid. And fn
counter-revolutions.
During the 17th and 18th een
centralization at the cost of the pow>
was run mainly by well-trained boi
the higher nobility and the high'
nobility, partly impoverished in the
of Versailles, was prestigious but p
with its lack of prestige as its wealt
lives of many people: bourgeois b
identifying with the bourgeois val
This shift in social positions v>
debate that the argument of nihilv
In the beginning the debate wa
ists stood against the so-called Ge
oldest: those of the king as heir of 1
the old German invaders. As sei
replaced by modern, mechanistic
466f.,Gohring, 1946). We see this
Barrière. 1946; Shackleton, 1961;
the nobility, the "thèse nobiliare,"
forces and counterforces. In his
necessary to counterbalance royal
monarchy, changing it into mere d
zation, means a weakening of the :
by Montesquieu in his L 'Esprit d,
»hen OK realizes that one is fooled,
., \bl. 3:853).
and downs of the term nihilism and
ng, we can say that nihilism has too
'lematic status was for Nietzsche, the
s concept. Rather, he saw it as an
I by the complete breakdown of the
j| status of the concept will make it
. the opposite.3. After Nietzsche had
kers the opportunity to project into it
i opportunity marry took. "Nihilism"
Kological connotations. We already
e is also "positive" and "negative,"
im. Very different things and persons
i its totality as nihilistic (1961: Vol.
ley Rosen claimed that everything is
rmann Rauschning called Hitler and
as well.'And mete are only a few out
t thinkers used the concept. Why did
liance and the fragmentary character
prestigious, but also inspiring and
te a powerful concept, apt to impress
why they used it for such divergent
oncept of nihilism should be used for
a common property that makes them
ibject that is eager to call them so.
ith properties of an object, but with
bject. This means that a sociological
e in a so-called nihilistic society, but
iety itself as nihilistic. What I am
:rty. We should study "nihilism" as a
ogical tradition. It is not well known
Jilion because the word, "nihilism"
n in the standard definition above, is
19th century France is the subject of
:thing more of the way the concept of
I can do so without ailing into the trap of
, because I started with a logical analysis
turn to social science to understand its
.octal function of a concept is taken as a
sblom, 1977:18.
THE PROBLEM OF NIHILISM: A SOCIOLOGICAL APPROACH
NIHILISM IN THE FRENCH SOCIOLOGICAL TRADITION
For investigating the use of the concept of nihilism as a label, the French sociological
tradition has many advantages. To begin with, it is a real tradition: authors build on the results
of their predecessors. Secondly, it is a truly sociological tradition. The French reflect directly
on society, without hiding behind or slipping away completely into all kinds of metaphysics,
like the Germans. This makes their critique of society straightforward. As we saw, the use of
the concept of nihilism has something to do with the arrival of modern society, and this brings
us to a third advantage. As opposed to the English case, where modernity was slowly
incorporated into traditional society through a long process of adaptation, the changes in
France were more abrupt, nuking the situation relatively clear, and thus easier to grasp. There
are two parties, one in favor of modernization, and one against it. This clarity does not imply
that the authors belonging to the different sides themselves had clear-cut positions. Many of
them were ambivalent; their personal ambitions were sometimes inconsistent with the politi-
cal opinions they advocated. I see this also as an advantage of France, for ambiguous authors
in a clear-cut situation often have to express their position with extra force, not only to make it
clear for their public and their allies, but also for themselves.
French classical sociology was born in the context of the political debate on modernity.
This debate lasted for at least two centuries. It was continuously linked to the threat of physical
violence. During the 18th century the protagonists of modernity could easily be captured.
Both Voltaire and Diderot actually were. Voltaire could not live, but only die in Fans. He
always lived near the bonier of the country. Rousseau was on the run for a long time and ended
as an estranged paranoid. And from 1789 on, France was the country of revolutions and
counter-revolutions.
During die 17th and 18th centuries, modernization in France meant, in the first place,
centralization at the cost of the power of the traditional feudal nobility. The central government
was run mainly by well-trained bourgeois professionals, most of them lawyers. Both groups,
the higher nobility and the higher bourgeoisie, suffered from status inconsistency. The
nobility, partly impoverished in die country, partly subjected to a bizarre etiquette at the court
of Versailles, was prestigious but powerless, while the bourgeoisie became more discontented
with its lack of prestige as its wealth and power grew. This caused ambiguities in the personal
lives of many people: bourgeois buying noble tides in order to gain prestige, and noblemen
identifying with the bourgeois values in order to get more real influence.
This shift in social positions was accompanied by a debate on modernity. And it is in this
debate that the argument of nihilism appears embryonically but very clearly.
In the beginning the debate was fought with traditional arguments: the so-called Roman-
ists stood against the so-called Germanists, disputing the question of whose rights were the
oldest: those of the king as heir of the Roman stadtholder, or thoseof the nobility as the heir of
the old German invaders. As science advanced, these traditional arguments were partly
replaced by modern, mechanistic ones, taken from Newton and Locke (Gay, 1973, Vol 2:
466f.,Göhring, 1946). Wfe see this in the work of Montesquieu (1689-1755) (Althusser, 1959;
Barrière, 1946; Shackleton, 1961; Starobinsky, 1953). As the main protagonist of die case of
the nobility, the "thèse nobiliare, " he defended tradition with modern arguments, a theory of
forces and counterforces. In his vision, intermediate powers, such as the nobility, were
necessary to counterbalance royal power. The disappearance of nobility would unbalance the
monarchy, changing it into mere despotism. And since centralization, so typical of moderni-
zation, means a weakening of the nobility, it also bears in it the seed of despotism, described
by Montesquieu in his L'Esprit des Lois as follows:
l.
6 SOCIOLOGICAL ANALYSIS
. . . There is no law but the will of the prince (1748, Vol. 5:16).
but in a despotic government, where there is neither honour nor virtue. . . (op. cit.,
\fel. 5:17).
men are all equal, . . . because they are nothing (op. cit., Vol. 6:2).
Obviously, these utterances are not true. They stand in a violent contrast to the scientific
sophistication that characterizes the book as a whole, which is a monument of Enlightenment.
We see a fierce statement of conservatism, according to which the consequences of centraliza-
tion lead to nothingness. Here, we have, in the middle of the 18th century, a prelude of what
will be a full-fledged debate in the next: the critique of nihilism And here we see quite
clearly the political bias and the emotional weight of the statement. It is hardly an analysis, it
is a derogatory label.
What made Montesquieu, the cool analyst, lose himself in this way? One reason could be
the ambiguity of bis social position. On the one hand he was one of the most famous
intellectuals of France, on the other he was a member of the feudal-landed nobility, and as
such hated centralization and everything else Louis XIV achieved.
Another aspect of the concept of nihilism, the one we saw in the work of Dostoevsky, is
foreshadowed by Vbtaire (1694-1778) (Bestermann, 1969; Gay, 1969; Alderidge, 1975;
Pomeau. 1955), the most outspoken advocate of centralization in the same debate on moder-
nity. Following Descartes, Voltaire thought that a condition for progressive reform of society
was to make tabula rusa of traditional institutions and beliefs, to be brought about by a strong
centra] government:
Do you want good laws? Bum the old and make new (cited in Pomeau, 1955:78).
But the implications of this were dangerous. Radical skepticism about the social order
meant the end of the outdated feudal system, the corrupted and narrow-minded clergy
("écrasez l'infâme!"), and the haled court-elite; but, \bltaire realized, h might in the end
destroy any order, even the one to which he owed his social position. Therefore, his skepticism
had tobe restricted.
It (i.e., traditional belief) must be destroyed among respectable people but maintained for
the canaille large and small for whom it was made (Gay, 1973, \bl. 2:521).
For
I want my attorney, my tailor, my servants, even my wife to believe in God; and I think
that I shall then be robbed and cuckolded less often (cited in Gay, 1959:265).
Radical skepticism will cause what we might call normlessness or even nihilism. God is the
remedy:
If God did not exist, one would have to invent bim (ibid.).
Voltaire's well-known disdain for the people led to a severe stigmatization: society would be
normless as a consequence of democratized skepticism. In fact, Voltaire drew for his time, in
which skepticism advanced, the consequences of an older argument, used for instance by
Grolius, that belief in God creates obedience of the people and thus order in the society. Apart
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from this, his fear is not limited to the common people: it applies to the elite as well:
An atheist king is more dangerous than a fanatical Ravaillac (Gay, 1973, Vol. 2:527).
The solution of Voltaire's problem is then simple: the country should be governed by an
enlightened, central meritocracy: Plato's philosopher-king. The people should be led very
slowly from Christianity to a simple version of deism (Bestermann, 1969:469).
The changes Voltaire wanted were very radical, and yet very restricted. This reflects the
ambiguity of his social position. Voltaire was a parvenu in 18th century court-society, which
he hated for the humiliations he had to suffer. But he needed court and king to make his
ambitions come true. He had two kinds of ambitions: the social climbing of himself as a
person, and the climbing of the group of French philosophes of which he was a leader. For his
personal climbing he used all the means available, exhausting his talents for brilliant conversa-
tion, writing plays and poems, buying noble titles, only to discover that he was still not taken
seriously. To allow Ute philosophes as a group to climb, he proposed that new society. But here
he faced the problem with which the "haute bourgeoisie" would become familiar during the
coming decade«. His own position, however unsatisfying, was nevertheless coupled with the
tradition he was so skeptical aboul. Too radical a skepticism meant sawing the branch on
which he himself was sitting.
We will deal shortly with another aspect of modernity: civilization and the belief in
progress. Jean-Jacques Rousseau (1712-1778) (Deralbe, 1970; Green, 1955; Grimsley, 1973;
Hendel, 1974; May. 1961; Slarobinsky, 1971) attacked this in his famous letter to \toltairc on
the Lisbon earthquake. Rousseau held that it was civilization, city-life, that caused the horror,
not the earthquake itself. Had the people lived near nature, they would have been neither
injured nor killed.
1 for one see the disasters wrought by man to be far more cruel than those that nature
brings us. But however clever we may be at increasing our wretchedness through our
institutions, we have till today not succeeded in perfecting ourselves so far that life in
general has become a burden for us and we chose nothingness above being (Rousseau,
1959, Vfol. 4:1062).
But it is not civilization as such that leads to nothingness, but the civilization of luxury and
pomp like that of the elites in French society. Rousseau advises Voltaire to consult the petty
bourgeois to get to know the true life:
Who did you consult on that, sir? The rich perhaps, glutted as they are with their evil
pleasures, and oblivious of their real needs, always bored with life and constantly afraid
to lose it? Or the learned who sit on a chair more and are therefore sicker than anybody
else, who think more and are therefore less happy than other men. . . . Why don't you
talk with the honest citizen, who has led a quiet anonymous life, without plan and
ambitions; a good craftsman, living out of his craft, or a farmer even, not from France of
course, where farmers are allowed to starve in order to let us live, but a farmer from a free
country, from Geneva for instance (op. cit., 1063).
To appreciate fully the passion with which Rousseau attacks high society, again we must
consider his ambiguity. He was of modest descent, but due to his intellectual capacities he was
highly appreciated by the elites of his time, and he was charmed by this admiration. However,
at the same time, he was embarrassed by his popularity. Time and again he had to cast this
spell off, and often he did this by ravaging his friends.
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Cultivating his estrangement, he abhorred high society, be it noble or high-bourgeois. But
it was only in the high-bourgeois salons that he could pul forth his talents. He wanted to use
these talents for the sake of the humble people, but just these were not taken seriously in the
salons. So, we see that in fact status-inconsistency was a major part of his problem.
Now Montesquieu warned of the nihilism of the absolute monarch; Voltaire, advocating
centralization, was afraid of the nihilism of the "canaille, " and Rousseau, taking the perspec-
tive of what Voltaire would call "canaille," accused the haute bourgeoisie of nihilism.
Did these three writers, who all died before the French revolution, have at their disposal a
full-fledged concept of nihilism? No, but together they did use arguments, such as skepticism
and nothingness, that will in later times cluster around the concept of nihilism. These
arguments seem to be the prototype of what is coming. As such we might learn from these
three pre-revolutionary authors something about the use of this type of concept. It is remark-
able that the arguments are used as a derogatory label against their social and political
adversaries. They are stigmatized as being or bringing about nothingness, whatever their
position is. The fierceness of the attack may be ascribed to the writer's ambivalence resulting
from his status-inconsistency. What we see in all three cases is mainly a prognosis, a warning
of what could happen if the author's side were to lose. This obviously changes after the
struggle has taken place.
The revolution changed the debate on modernity. The themes were often the same:
centralization and freedom, the value of tradition, and the effect of skepticism; but the mood in
which the discussion took place was different. After the big confrontation, there were winners
and losers, and the price paid, especially by the losers, had been high. This made the
discussion more fierce.
To get a balanced vision on the use of the concept of nihilism after the revolution, we will
study both losers and winners. "Losers" are those who felt that the revolution meant a
dramatic deterioration of the social perspectives of themselves or their class. We will first turn
to two losers, both of them noblemen: Joseph de Maistre and Alexis de Tbcqueville.
Joseph de Maistre (1753-1821) was the main spokesman of the reactionary party (Barth,
1958; Cioran, 1952; Cignoux, 1963; Le Brun, 1965; Triomphe, 1968.)In his analysis, we see
the same rhetoric against his adversaries as we saw earlier, only fiercer:
Learned barbarism, systematic cruelty, calculating decadence and especially irreligion
have never achieved anything; the strength of youth leads to maturity; decay leads to
nothing (Maistre, 1952:198).
This vehemence, due no longer to ambivalence alone, but also to the bloodshed, is not the
only difference. What in the work of the 18th century writers was only an incidental progno-
sis, has now become a full-fledged diagnosis. Nihilism is seen as a reality. As such it needs a
theory that both explains its causes and snows a way out. Such a theory is to be found in the
works of Maistre. Nihilism, the revolution, that is to say the most radical overthrow of
tradition, is nothing else than the utmost consequence of the reformation' (Maistre, 1966:355).
What the " rienisme protestant"1 did on the level of religion has now come about in all sectors
of society. We have now learned that skepticism of tradition knows no end, bringing terrible
consequences. Actually, this theory is the prototype of the theory on the origin of nihilism
which we find in the work of Nietzsche. The horror of Robespierre's "terreur" and the
Napoleonic wars were for Maistre lessons from God, to prepare us for the acceptance of what
is indispensable for an orderly society: the absolute authority of pope and king (Maistre,
1952:184).
7. Sic. cited by Barth, op. cit. 1S3. Luther and Calvin are called "hommes de néant," 1966, 354.
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I feel more misplaced every day (cited by Triomphe, op. cit., 3S2).
I die with Europe (cited by Cioran, op. cit., 33).
The work of Alexis de Tocqueville (1805-1859) (Birnbaum, 1970; Bulks, 1979; Eichtal,
1897; Lively, 1962; Mayer, 1939; Pierson, 1938; Poggi, 1972; Redier, 1925; \bssler, 1973),
like that of Maistre, can be interpreted as an attempt to undo the revolution. But his social and
theoretical point of departure is completely different, and so is his mentality. He is not a
Catholic reactionary, but a conservative humanist. He realizes that the way back to a tradi-
tional society does not exist, and that the most be can do is to try to save some essential
elements of h, if necessary in a modern shape. For him, the essentials were exactly what they
had been for Montesquieu: power should not be concentrated in a centralized state. This idea
is the main reason for his famous journey to America, where he found a system that was both
modem and decentralized.
This difference in temperament between Maistre and Tocqueville can be ascribed to at
least two things: Ibcqueville lived in a relatively calmer era and could look from a distance at
the Revolution, and he had a different family history. Maistre was a nobleman only of the
second generation. His father bought the title. This caused him some uneasiness. There was
no family tradition, he did not know how to behave. In the beginning of the revolution he did
not even know which side to choose. This may have been a factor in his fierce utterances
against everything untraditknal. Ibcqueville, on the other hand, came from an old and
honorable noble family, with a strong tradition of Aonnèteté-a. This honnttete-a implied a
sticking to one'« post as long as possible, and trying to make the best of it, and « strict
separation of public behavior and private feelings. This mentality is not compatible with
emotional abuse. So we will not find him fiercely «"*^ i""E his opponents very often in the
works he himself published. When he does, it is in a prophesy of what the ultimate conse-
quences will be of what he, like Montesquieu, seeks to fight—centralization of government:
It is in vain to summon a people who have been rendered so dependent on the central
power to choose from time to time the representatives of mat power; this rare and brief
exercise of their free choice, however important it may be, will not prevent them from
gradually losing the faculties of thinking, feeling, and acting for themselves, and thus
gradually ailing below the level of humanity (Ibcqueville, 1945, Vol. 2:339).
If we want to know how he really felt about modern times, we should turn to his private
writings: his "Souvenirs" and his correspondence. There he describes what happened to him
when, as a boy, he came into contact with modern ideas in the library of his father:
Until then my life had unrolled in a full belief that never allowed doubt to penetrate my
soul. At that moment, it did so, or rather, the doubt thrust itself into my mind with an
enormous force—not a question of this or that, but a universal unbelief. I experienced
something like an earthquake, . . . the whole of nature in disarray. I was seized by the
blackest melancholy, by a loathing for life that was new to me ... now and then the
impressions from my childhood (I was sixteen at the time) take hold of me again. Then I
again see the world of the mind revolving, and I feel lost and alarmed in this universal
movement that upsets all the truths on which I have built my faith and my deeds and turns
them upside down (cited by Redier, 287f).
Shortly before his death, despairing of the realization of his ideals, due to the coups d'état
of Napoleon III , he wrote to his friends words not unlike those of Joseph de Maistre:
l
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We belong to a moral and intellectual family that is dying out. In the past people had
ideals, now they only have interests. There used to be bonds between people that have
disappeared. It is sad, sir, to outlive one's Fatherland (cited by Vossler. 1973:177).
The feeling that the turn from tradition to modernity causes in the losers can be put into a
short formula: since my world is destroyed, au world is destroyed.' Everything seems
useless, meaningless, nothingness. The stigmatizing of the adversary is here combined with a
deep melancholy. The adversary is no longer a well-defined category of people. It is the whole
world. Therefore, existence has lost its value.
What both Maistre and Tocqueville are talking about fits quite well into my standard
definition of nihilism. In Maistre there is an elaborate theory of its history and in Ibcqueville
we see the existential side of nihilism. Both authors are evaluating as nihilistic a change that
has indeed come about in society. It is perceived as an unbearable but unescapable truth.
How do the winners evaluate this change? A winner is here defined as a person who
identifies with the class that gained power after the revolution.
One such winner is Auguste Comte (1798-1857) (Gouhier, 1933, 1965; Lacroix, 1973;
Levy-Brûhl, 1910), not because he was very successful in life, but because he consequently
believed in the coming of an industrialized paradise in which he and his theories would play a
major pan. Disillusionment did not cause bitterness, but at most religious mania. Analyzing
the condition of his time, the first half of the 19th century, he spoke of "spiritual anarchy. " But
unlike Maistre or Tocqueville, he sees it as a necessary but temporary stage that can easily be
overcome when properly understood. True, people had no values, no ideals that could give
their lives meaning and a direction. This was reinforced by young poets who spoke of the "mal
du sciecle," the "evil of the century. " They stuck to this idea, according to Comte, because
they did not understand what was going on. To explain mis. Comte combined the theories of
Maistre and Condorcet, the 18th century prophet of progress. To what the first had attributed
an absolute significance, the second completely despised—tradition. Because of this total
opposition of tradition and progress, neither could understand the development of society, in
which progress comes forth out of tradition. To fill this gap. Comte developed his rather
sophisticated theory of the three stages, according to which society developed from a theologi-
cal, via a metaphysical, into a scientific, positive era. Vie might say that Comte provides us
with a sociological theory of the genesis of nihilism, that is superior to mat of Nietzsche in his
elaborateness and precision. In the first half of the 19th century, everything traditional has
come to an end, or completely lost its credibility. But nobody can see yet what positive content
is about to take its place. That is to say, nobody but Auguste Comte. He is the prophet,
literally, of the new, positive era. He will lead society out of the present spiritual anarchy by
formulating a new faith:
Faith, that is the inclination to believe spontaneously, without preceding proof, in dogmas
that are proclaimed by a capable authority. This is indeed the indispensable condition for
establishing and maintaining a true intellectual and moral community (1978:319).
What the lack of such a community means is deeply analyzed in his early works:
The decline of theological philosophy and the associated spiritual power has robbed
society of every moral discipline (288-293).
8. Elilde says: "... in the view of archaic societies, everything that is not 'our world' in not yet a
world." (1959:32). Here the reverse is going on: whit is no longer our world is no longer a world.
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This has severe consequences:
The intelligence of the people completely going astray.
Almost all public morality disappearing.
The purely materialistic point of view much gaining in importance (ibid.).
Everyone has his or her own opinion; a common opinion is lacking. It is interesting that
Comte lakes completely as negative what could be taken more positively. Spiritual anarchy, as
he called it can of course be interpreted as an undesirable state of affairs, but it can as well be
positively interpreted as pluralism, as a sign of a really free society. But own the theory of the
three stages, and especially the positive stage, would need some reconsideration. Comte still
thought that there should be perfect consensus on morals and polities.
This is exactly the point on which he was criticized by another winner, Durkheim (1858-
1917) (Aron, 1967; Giddens, 1971; König, 1978; Lukes, 1973; Nisbet, 1975; Poggi, 1972;
Tiryakian, 1978.) He was a winner because he could completely identify with the successful
third republic. In his Division of Labor in Society he criticized Comte for not seeing that
division of labor, that essential property of modem society, makes a certain degree of
pluralism possible, thanks to organic solidarity (Durkheim, 1967:352). Nevertheless,
Durkheim also saw the problems caused by differentiation and pluralism, that might even
spread, from time to time, over society as a whole. Here he spoke of a moral crisis, "asthénie
moral," moral weakness, anomie, and egoism.' This state of society is not caused by plural-
ism as such, but by temporary shortcomings of social intégration. This was one of the main
concern of Durkheim. He studied it during his whole career in a scientific way. He even
claimed to be able to measure it (Durkheim, 1967:226). Durkheim sought the remedy in the
tradition of Montesquieu and TbcquevUle: small-scale structures, of any kind, implying a
better integration and discipline, should keep people from the abyss of mal-intégration, that
caused so much harm.
The cause of the moral crisis of the time was, according to Durkheim, not modernity, or
science, or the ideas of the Enlightenment, as its adversaries suggested. He fiercely polemi-
cized against this opinion. He defended the Enlightenment as the only remedy, even speaking
in moral terms, calling it "innocent." People who hated modern society and tried to stop its
development were responsible for the ongoing nihilism, whether they were explicitly reaction-
ary or not:
The anarchist, die aesthete, the mystic, the socialist revolutionary, even if they do not
despair of the future, have in common with me pessimist a single sentiment of hatred and
disgust for the existing order, a single craving to destroy or to escape from reality.
Collective melancholy would not have penetrated consciousness so far, if it had not
undergone a morbid development. . . (Durkheim, 1970:370).
So we see that the social and political confusion after the revolution is described as
nihilism, both by winners and losers. The concept still functions as a polemical tool in the
debate on modernization. But now it is more than just a rhetorical means. Since nihilism is
seen as an adequate description of the social confusion, theories have been developed about its
essence and genesis. But losers and winners analyze it in a different way, according to their
hing that is not 'our world' in not yet l
longer our world is DO longer • world.
9. These terras play the most important role in hit work. He sometimes lues die word '•nihilism," which
shows that he was familiar with it. U is possible that he did not often use it because of his familiarity with
the metaphysical and ethical connotations this word had.
r-
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political aspirations. Losers see it as the final outcome of a fatal historical flaw, winners see it
as a temporary evil, as a stage in history, that can be overcome.
"NIHILISM" AS A LABEL AND FORMS OF LIFE
We have seen that the criticism of "nihilism" is used against groups of people who have
little in common. What is constant is not a property of the object, but the relation between
subject and object. "Nihilism" is a label, used in specific kinds of relations. So what are the
relations in common between Rauschning and Hitler, Rosen and a-rationality, Nietzsche and
Christianity, Rousseau and the civilized French elite, Maistre and the revolutionaries? Pear.
The labelers feel threatened by the labelled, in what I would call with a term borrowed from
Wittgenstein, the form of life10 of the labelled. They may, as Nietzsche or Rosen, call the form
of life itself nihilistic, or a person or group that stands for that form of life. They fear it
because it is a real alternative for the form of life they themselves live in or long for.
A property of forms of life, as I understand them here, is that they are objectivated:
experienced as objective and often as absolute. This absolute validity makes their functioning
relatively unproblemaiic. The absoluteness of the form of life makes people feel safe and at
home. This means that all people in it have a great interest in the maintenance of their form of
life and of its absoluteness.
Because of the sense of absolute validity of a form of life, every alternative is a challenge
and a threat. It shows people that their own form of life is not as absolute as they thought it
was, and this makes them feel uncertain. This feeling has its grounds. What begins as the
challenge of an alternative may end as the destruction of the original form of life. Now, real
alternatives occur relatively seldom. Often, other forms of life are loo weak to be viable
alternatives. They are perceived as deviations, and as such serve to strengthen the dominant
form of life. Or they can be too strange to be competitive. To be a convincing alternative, and
thus a threat, a form of life has to be quite akin to the existing one. Then, if it has enough
prestige, for instnnrr because il is supported by powerful people, it can be perceived as
competing. Then strategies are developed to destroy it, or at least to neutralize its effects. One
of these strategies is what Berger and Luclunann call "nihilation," defined as the ascribing of
a negative ontological status (1967:114f). So a competing form of life may be called decadent,
or sinful, or heretic. To be really effective, of course, these qualifications have to be objecti-
vated. They have to he seen as essential properties of the competing alternative form of life and
not as qualifications made by people who feel threatened. The label is hypostasized. It
becomes a definition or a redefinition of a part of reality. The label is not experienced as a
label but as a real state of affairs.
In my view, the most radical form of nihilation is to say that a life form, or the people who
propagate it, are nothing at all—that is to say, nihilistic.
This interpretation of nihilism as a label leaves much to be explained. Why, to begin with,
10. Of all the concepts I had the opportunity to choose from, here Wittgenstein's seems the most elegant.
"Form of life" expresses in simple words the importance of the thing it connotes. This is not the place for
a long argument about the exact meaning of Wittgenstein's term. I will use it in its widest sense. Then it
refers to a set of rules, values in which people live, and which constitute what Schutz called their
paramount reality. Furthermore, I will use the concept not as a philosophical but as a sociological
concept. Disregarding many philosophical subtleties, I will combine it with sociological theory, espe-
cially that of Berger and Luclunann. (Ludwig Wittgenstein. Philosophische Untersuchungen, Frankfurt
am Main: 1971; feter Berger and Thomas Luckrnann, The Social Construction of Reality, New York:
1967).
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dkl the concept of nihilism appear only at the end of the 18th century as a label of abuse? Why
was this radical label not used before, but only in this stage of the process of modernization?
After all, there have been earlier attempts to overthrow tradition or to challenge the dominant
form of life.
In those times, however, the social order was interpreted in religious terms, and nihilation
went along, so until the 18th century competing forms of life were called heretic or pagan, and
vague feelings of uneasiness about the forms of life might be worked off with tales of sorcery.
The label of nihilism, however, presupposes that the world can be understood in meta-
physical terms. The intellectual discourse must be a metaphysical, not a theological one. This
means that a certain degree of secularization is necessary for die use of the label "nihilism."
This was indeed the case at the end of the 18th and first half of die 19th century. Secular
thought was an important quality of the bourgeoisie, dial look over power little by little. Step
by step, die value of die aristocratic tradition was questioned intellectually, up to Hume's Mai
skepticism. However, die claim of August Comte dut dus philosophy was only negative is not
correct. There were many efforts to construct die foundation of what was intended as a new,
unshakable system. From 1600 on, there were die grandiose philosophical systems of
Hoboes, Leibniz, Locke, Berkeley, Hume, Wolf, Kant, Fichte, Schelling, Hegel, and many
others. These constructions were highly rational, and in them God played only a secondary
role. But die absolute as such was still immensely important. The absoluteness of systems of
thought, or even of forms of life, was taken as objective, not as a human postulate. Even
Comte was not able to interpret what he called "anarchie spirtiuelle" in a positive way. He was
still looking for that one system that seemed monolidiic, and that could become as prestigious
and charismatic as the aristocratic form of life had been." In this period the forms of life arc
not yet seen as a human set of values and norms, but as a set of rules dut are in principle
absolute—or, as Hegel and Coma; saw it, that are changing according to a fixed pattern in die
direction of an absolute end.
In this kind of thinking, everything that is not absolutely true may seem absolutely untrue.
This sin against logic should not amaze us. (Perhaps in a world where the relativity of truth
has not yet been discovered, and truth is absolute by definition, it is not even a sin against
logic.) At any rate, die discovery dial there are no absolute values or ends outside one's form
of living is a terrible one for people who have an absolute trust in their values. When dus
discovery coincides, not accidentally, with great social upheavals, dien die concept of nihilism
seems very appropriate to die situation. It corresponds in its totality to the struggle dial is
going on, in its confusion to the turmoil that exist, and in its hopelessness to die melancholy
that die many losers feel.
It is, in my opinion, quite easy to understand why both losers and winners used the label.
The dominant intellectual tradition was a bourgeois one, that of metaphysics and science. If
the losers, for the greater pari aristocrats, wanted to nihilate die new situation in a credible
way, they had to conform to this tradition. This is what all the adversaries of modernity did,
from Montesquieu to Maistre and Tocqueville, It was, of course, not die only way; religious
labels were still in use. Maistre, for instance, quite often calls die revolution godless or
devilish. But diese are not his most influential passages.
The winners used the label of nihilism, because the metaphysical .i.e. absolute ideals they
had projected in modernity did not come true. The chaos that came out of the revolution was as
far removed from their ideals as it was from feudalism. But since die groups they identified
with were most often in power, they had a chance to redress die situation. For diem, die
revolution was only a rather unfortunate beginning. For die losers, it was die end indeed.
11. Here he does not differ, as Durkheim correctly notes, from the metaphysicians.
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But who were losers and who were winners? After more than 150 years, it is as easy to tell
who won and who lost as it is to describe the process of modernization. At the time, these
things were not so clear cut. It was hard to see what was going on, and to choose with which
party to side. Whatever the diagnosis, one could hope for a favorable turn. Moreover, there is
a difference between belonging to the group of losers or winners from an objective and from a
subjective point of view. The authors we just studied identified themselves personally with
winners or losers, in the end. But as many times it was as difficult to choose as it was to see
who was winning. There were revolutions every twenty years. The loser in one epoch saw
himself as a winner in the next. So the situation, though clear in principle, was very
ambiguous in reality. The corresponding ambivalence, in any author I described, was consid-
erable. One of the functions of nihilan'on and labeling in such a situation is not only to
strengthen their own form of life by characterization of the rival as nothingness, but also to
create clarity. This partly explains the fierceness of die labeling.
Now losers can be found to label nihilistic not only their opponents' form of life, but also
their own. In their disappointment they experienced the whole world, including themselves,
as nothingness. This feeling, as the example of Maistre and Tocqueville showed, is bound to a
deep melancholy, which results from the loss of power to carry things through. And after all,
to say that everything is worth nothing may also in a way be comforting. It is good to see that
one's failure is of no consequence, because both failure and success are pan of the general
nothingness.
It is no wonder that the concept of nihilism became very popular in intellectual circles. It
was able to explain the crisis that was going on in many ways, on many levels, in an
emotionally satisfying way.
WHY THE CONCEPT DISAPPEARED
Understanding the way the concept of nihilism functioned in society leads to understand-
ing why it disappeared. In the first place it was bound to the crisis of the coining of modem
society. Where the values of modernity could be introduced relatively early and smoothly and
found wide acceptance, as in the Anglo-Saxon countries, the concept of nihilism never played
an important role. In countries where the coming of modernity involved intense turmoil, it
did. But the crisis passed away, and so did the concept of nihilism. One dominant form of life
lost its power, and was gradually replaced by another; that was all. Slowly, people became
familiar with the idea that absolute ends and values do not exist, but that relative values may do
as well. In other words, people learned that pluralism is not the same as chaos, as long as there
is some consensus over some important values and a certain amount of tolerance. In fact,
pluralism itself became a central value in the West.
The struggle between modernity and tradition is over. Of course there are still disputes
over values, but they are not about modernity but about issues within the boundaries of
modernity. Nevertheless, the concept of nihilism comes back from time to time. It has become
a part of our cultural inheritance. It played an important role in the work of many thinkers
whose works have become classics. Therefore, the concept will not disappear completely.
From time to time, it will be used when there are crises concerning our forms of life.
Adolescents will discover it as a sophisticated way of describing and understanding their
situation. Politicians and moralists will try to reinforce their arguments by using it. Its
nihilating function will then be obvious. But however eloquently the concept is used, it will
never regain the strength it had around the end of the 19th century.
So why bother about the concept at all? Can we still learn something from the fortunes of
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a concept that is out of date? Yes, we can. First, we have seen how philosophical and
sociological reflection on social reality, on values and norms, can be influenced by its social
context. This could make us a little suspicious of cultural criticism in general. When we speak
in our own time of the culture of narcissism, for instance, or secularism, we should be aware
of this. When we speak disdainfully about others, or about culture, there might be something
wrong nol with them, but with our relation with them. We should always be prepared that our
most sophisticated and elaborate concepts might, in the end. turn out to be nihilating labels.
And so we come to the second point. We are familiar with theories about the functions
that tales of sorcery and witchcraft may have in times of social upheaval. But do we also realize
thai in modem times the same thing may occur, not in a religious, but in a philosophical or
even a scientific shape? This is what happened with the concept of nihilism. There is a
continuity between the use of this concept and the much studied European "witchcraze." It is
difficult to recognize this continuity, for the concept of nihilism is still very familiar to us.
Although out of use, it is part of the conceptual tradition that is ours.
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